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THE GREAT RECESSION AND THE RHETORICAL
CANONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Michael D. Murray*
Abstract
The Great Recession of 2008 and onward has drawn attention to the
American economic and financial system, and has cast a critical
spotlight on the theories, policies, and assumptions of the modern,
neoclassical school of law and economics—often labeled the "Chicago
School"—because this school of legal economic thought has had great
influence on the American economy and financial system. The Chicago
School's positions on deregulation and the limitation or elimination of
oversight and government restraints on stock markets, derivative
markets, and other financial practices are the result of decades of
neoclassical economic assumptions regarding the efficiency of
unregulated markets, the near-religious-like devotion to a hypersimplified conception of rationality and self-interest with regard to the
persons and institutions participating in the financial system, and a
conception of laws and government policies as incentives and costs in a
manner that excludes the actual conditions and complications of reality.
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This Article joins the critical conversation on the Great Recession
and the role of law and economics in this crisis by examining
neoclassical and contemporary law and economics from the perspective
of legal rhetoric. The Great Recession already has caused several of the
stars of the Chicago School to recant their hardest, most definite
statements concerning market efficiency and the necessity of nonregulation and zero government oversight (or interference) in the
financial system. The law and economics movement is likely to regroup
or reform itself under a revised conception of market efficiency, as
indicated by the chastened admissions of the leaders of the old school, or
move in the direction of a revised conception of rational choice theory
represented by the thriving school of behavioral law and economics. In
order to better understand the law and economics movement now and in
the future, this Article joins the discussion by pointing out the
fundamental rhetorical canons of law and economics. These canons
have made law and economics a persuasive form of discourse:


Mathematical and scientific methods of analysis and
demonstration;



The characterization of legal phenomena as incentives and
costs;



The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency; and



Rational choice theory as corrected by modern behavioral
social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain science.

Law and economics has developed into a school of contemporary
legal rhetoric with a particular, effective combination of topics of
invention and arrangement and tropes of style that are relevant to legal
rhetoric beyond the economic analysis of law. My Article is the first to
examine the prescriptive implications of the rhetoric of law and
economics for general legal discourse as opposed to examining the
benefits and limitations of the economic analysis of law itself. This
Article advances the conversation in two areas: first, as to the study and
understanding of the persuasiveness of law and economics, particularly
because that persuasiveness has played a role in influencing American
economic and financial policy leading up to the Great Recession; and
second, as to the study and understanding of the use of economic topics
of invention and arrangement and tropes of style in general legal
discourse when evaluated in comparison to the other schools of classical
and contemporary legal rhetoric. My conclusion is that the rhetorical
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canons of law and economics can be used to create meaning and inspire
imagination in legal discourse beyond the economic analysis of law, but
the canons are tools that only are as good as the user, and can be
corrupted in ways that helped to bring about the current economic crisis.

INTRODUCTION
Why has law and economics been so persuasive
leading up to the Great Recession1?
This article examines law and economics as a school of
contemporary legal rhetoric with a particular combination of
rhetorical modes of communication and persuasion—the rhetorical
canons of law and economics—that have made it persuasive to
many audiences within and without the legal community. My goal
is to critique the rhetoric of the neoclassical and contemporary law
and economics2 analysis of law, not to examine the benefits or
costs of the application of one form of economic analysis or
1

I take the name, “Great Recession,” from none other than Nobel Laureate
Professor Joseph Stiglitz, who recently discounted decades of neoclassical
economic assumptions when he pointed out that “markets do not work well on
their own” and that in the recent recession, the United States suffered because
the economy lost its “balance between the role of markets and the role of
government.” JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND
THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY xii (2010).
2
I use the term “contemporary law and economics” to mean twenty-first
century law and economics that incorporates behavioral and socio-economic
approaches to the study and analysis of law. Contemporary law and economics
has evolved from “new” or “neoclassical” law and economics that developed in
the 1960s and which applied neoclassical economic principles and
methodologies to the analysis of law. New or neoclassical law and economics is
also referred to as “traditional” or “conventional” law and economics. See
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 31 (7th ed. 2007)
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW]; Thomas F. Cotter, Legal
Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2088
(1996); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical
Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 77, 83, 138 (2004)
[hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character]; Donald C.
Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance
with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 73; Joshua D. Wright, Behavioral Law
and Economics, Paternalism, and Consumer Contracts: An Empirical
Perspective, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 470, 470–72 (2007).
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another in shaping law and social policy.3 I seek to examine law
and economics as a rhetorical perspective in law so as to reveal and
demonstrate the combination of rhetorical canons that helped bring
about the Great Recession.4

3

Not to mention the Pareto superiority or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency obtained
through contemporary economic analysis of law. See ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 18 (5th ed. 2008).
4
Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New
Corporate Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 619 (2001) (“In its
more extreme forms, law and economics solutions to problems of human
behavior were paraded as “science” (not as social science but as “science”), the
findings of which were unassailable. Those who questioned were made to
appear ignorant or foolish.”); Timothy A. Canova, The Failing Bubble
Economy: American Exceptionalism and the Crisis in Legitimacy, 102 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 237, 238 (2008) (“Lawyers and legal scholars have tended
not to question the economic assumptions of orthodox economic models”);
Timothy A. Canova, Legacy of the Clinton Bubble, DISSENT, Summer 2008, at
41; Chunlin Leonhard, Subprime Mortgages and the Case for Broadening the
Duty of Good Faith, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 621, 622 (2011); Lawrence E. Mitchell,
The Morals of the Marketplace: A Cautionary Essay for Our Time, 20 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REV. 171, 173 (2009); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Board as a Path to
Corporate Responsibility, in Doreen McBarnet, THE NEW CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY (2007). Even the unofficial dean of the Chicago School,
Judge Richard Posner, has admitted the connection between neoclassical law
and economics and present economic crisis. See RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE
OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION xii, 270
(2009) (“We are learning from [the crisis] that we need a more active and
intelligent government to keep our model of a capitalist economy from running
off the rails. . . . [T]he market can be blamed for recessions, which without
government intervention would often turn into depressions, as they often did
before the government learned (we thought!) in the after-math of the Great
Depression how to prevent that from happening.”). Alan Greenspan, previously
a staunch advocate of non-regulation of the financial markets, has recently
recanted his faith in the self-correcting power of free markets. Alan Greenspan,
as quoted in EDMUND L. ANDREWS, BUSTED: LIFE INSIDE THE GREAT
MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 65 (2009). See also Alan Greenspan, The Crisis,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2010, at 3,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2010_spring_
bpea_papers/2010a_bpea_greenspan.pdf). Critics have noted that the Chicago
School has worked its effects not only on the United States economy, but
globally. See Paul H. Brietzke, Law and Economics Meets the Great Recession
(2012), copy on file with the author.
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Rhetoric and law and economics do not often share the same
paragraph in academic legal writing let alone the same article title,5
but a central focus of the discipline of law and economics is the
study of human nature and human behavior6 in order to predict
what incentives can be communicated to humans that will motivate
them to act or react, and thus law and economics shares a common
goal of rhetoric, the study of communication and persuasion. The
advocates of the economic analysis of law must persuade their own
cohorts of the truth of their discoveries, and use the rhetoric of
their discipline to do so, and also seek to communicate the lessons
of their economic analysis of law to the wider legal community,
and again use the rhetoric of their discipline to persuade the wider
audience. That law and economics is persuasive beyond the
confirmed members of the discipline is supported by modern
history: critics and supporters alike agree that law and economics
has established itself as the dominant and most influential
contemporary mode of analysis among American legal scholars.7

5

An exception being, Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and
Economics, 86 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1988) [hereinafter McCloskey, Rhetoric of
Law and Economics], a very useful discussion to which I will refer below.
6
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1474 (1998) (“law and
economics analysis may be improved by increased attention to insights about
actual human behavior”); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000) [hereinafter Korobkin & Ulen,
Law and Behavioral Science] ("Law and economics is, at root, a behavioral
theory, and therein lies its true power.").
7
Law and economics’ critics and proponents alike agree that the movement
has become the most dominant method of legal analysis among legal scholars in
at least the last fifty years. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The
Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power
Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 142–43 (2003)
[hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation], which states:
The law and economics movement is quite strongly entrenched in the
law schools, and is more powerful there than any of the other social
sciences. . . . [T]he flourishing of law and economics [is] undeniable,
. . . Economic analysis of law . . . has transformed American legal
thought, . . . [and] enjoyed unparalleled success in the legal academy

6
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The recognition that the rhetoric of law and economics is
persuasive—and not just to legal economists—reveals the
enormous potential of law and economics as a lens on legal
discourse through which to examine the structure and design of the
discourse and as a source of topoi (topics) of invention and
arrangement and tropes of style in the content of the discourse. It
also helps to explain why so many persons in the academy, the
legal profession, the courts, and government could be persuaded to
alter the economy and financial system of the United States in
accordance with the prescriptions of law and economics in ways
that helped to bring about the Great Recession.
The topoi and tropes of law and economics inspire inventive
thinking about the law that constructs meaning for the author and
the audience. For many members of the legal writing discourse
community—judges, practitioners, government agencies, and
academics—the modes of persuasion of law and economics can
provide a critical perspective to construct meaning and improve the
persuasiveness of legal discourse generally in content,
arrangement, and style. As such, law and economics rhetoric
should be recognized as a new school of contemporary rhetoric8

and in the judiciary . . . [making it] the most important development in
legal scholarship of the twentieth century.
Id. (inner citations omitted). See also POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW,
supra note 1, at xix ("[Law and economics is] the foremost interdisciplinary
field of legal studies”); Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J.
1835, 1836 & n.6 (2005) (law and economics surpasses other movements in
legal analysis, including law and literature).
8
Basic sources on contemporary rhetoric include: PATRICIA BIZZEL & BRUCE
HERZBERG, THE RHETORICAL TRADITION (Patricia Bizzel & Bruce Herzberg
eds., 1990); PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE (1987); Carroll C. Arnold,
Rhetoric in America since 1900, in RE-ESTABLISHING THE SPEECH PROFESSION:
THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS (Robert T. Oliver & Marvin G. Bauer eds., 1959); John
B. Bender & David E. Wellbery, Rhetoricality: On the Modernist Return of
Rhetoric, in THE ENDS OF RHETORIC: HISTORY, THEORY, PRACTICE (John B.
Bender & David E. Wellbery eds., 1990); James L. Kinneavy, Contemporary
Rhetoric, in THE PRESENT STATE OF SCHOLARSHIP IN HISTORICAL AND
CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC (Winifred B. Horner ed., rev. ed. 1990);. See also
sources cited in notes 7–9, infra.
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that joins the existing schools—modern argument theory,9 writing
as a process theory,10 and discourse community theory11—as a lens

9

See, e.g., JEROME BRUNER & ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, MINDING THE LAW,
chs. 2–3, 6–7 (2002); CHAIM PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE
NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson & Purcell
Weaver trans., 1969); STEPHEN TOULMIN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO
REASONING (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter TOULMIN, INTRODUCTION TO
REASONING]; FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF
ARGUMENTATION THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS AND
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS (1996); Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor,
Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court
Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949 (2007)
(the corporate metaphor in modern argument theory); Linda L. Berger, What is
the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor
Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 169
(2004) (use of metaphor in modern argument theory and cognitive studies);
Michael R. Smith, Rhetoric Theory and Legal Writing: An Annotated
Bibliography, 3 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 129, 139 (2006)
[hereinafter Smith, Rhetoric Theory]; Kathryn Stanchi, Persuasion: An
Annotated Bibliography, 6 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 75, 80–81
(2009) [hereinafter Stanchi, Persuasion].
10
See Linda L. Berger, A Reflective Rhetorical Model: The Legal Writing
Teacher as Reader and Writer, 6 LEGAL WRITING 57 (2000) [hereinafter Berger,
Reflective Rhetorical Model]; Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal
Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 155 (1999); Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the
Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163 (1993);
Leigh Hunt Greenhaw, “To Say What the Law Is”: Learning the Practice of
Legal Rhetoric, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 861 (1995); Carol McCrehan Parker,
Writing Throughout the Curriculum: Why Law Schools Need It and How to
Achieve It, 76 NEB. L. REV. 561 (1997); Teresa Godwin Phelps, The New Legal
Rhetoric, 40 SW. L.J. 1089 (1986); Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 139.
11
See Brook K. Baker, Language Acculturation Process and the Resistance to
In “doctrine” ation in the Legal Skills Curriculum and Beyond: A Commentary
on Mertz's Critical Anthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal Classroom, 34 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 131 (2000); Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking,
Writing, and Entering the Discourse of Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489 (2002);
Terrill Pollman, Building a Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking
About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887 (2002); J. Christopher Rideout &
Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REV. 35 (1994);
Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 139; Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is
Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law's Marginalization
of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7 (1998); Joseph M. Williams, On the
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through which to examine and improve the persuasiveness of legal
discourse.
Law and economics is a discipline that brings a unique
combination of modes of persuasion used both as rhetorical topoi12
and tropes13 to construct meaning and to inform and persuade its
audiences: the priority of mathematical and scientific methods of
analysis and demonstration, the characterization of legal
phenomena as incentives and costs, the rhetorical economic
concept of efficiency, and the lessons of rational choice theory as
Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and Development, 1 LEGAL
WRITING 1 (1991).
12
In rhetoric, the topoi [Greek] or loci [Latin] (singular, topos or locus =
“place”) are the “topics” or “subjects” of argument that can be made in various
situations. Topoi are developed in the process of inventio [Latin] or heuresis
[Greek], which may be translated as “invention” or “discovery” of the type of
argument that will be most persuasive in the situation, and in the dispositio
[Latin] or taxis [Greek] of the argument, which translates as the “arrangement”
or “organization” or “disposition” of the contents of the argument. See EDWARD
P.J. CORBETT & ROBERT J. CONNORS, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN
STUDENT 17, 20, 89–91 (4th ed. 1999); Gabriele Knappe, Classical Rhetoric in
Anglo-Saxon England, 27 ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND 5, 25 (Cambridge 1998).
13
Tropes are developed in the rhetorical process of style (Latin elocutio;
Greek lexis), which pertains to the composition and wording of the discourse,
including grammar, word choice, and figures of speech. See generally CORBETT
AND CONNORS, supra note 10, at 20, 378; Knappe, supra note 10, at 25–26;
Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 129, 133–34 & n.2 (collecting sources
on style in classical rhetoric). Figures of speech were divided into tropes
(creative variations on the meanings of words) and schemes (artful deviations
from the ordinary arrangements of words). Linda L. Berger, Studying and
Teaching “Law as Rhetoric”: A Place to Stand, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3,
51 & n.179 (2010) [hereinafter Berger, Law as Rhetoric]. Professors Berger,
Corbett, and Connors identify the classically identified tropes as metaphor,
simile, synecdoche, and metonymy; puns; antanaclasis (or repetition of a word
in two different senses); paronomasia (use of words that sound alike but have
different meanings); periphrasis (substitution of a descriptive word for a proper
name or of a proper name for a quality associated with the name);
personification; hyperbole; litotes (deliberate use of understatement); rhetorical
question; irony; onomatopoeia; oxymoron; and paradox. CORBETT AND
CONNORS, supra, note 10, at 395–409; Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra, at 51 &
n.179. See also MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING 199–248
(metaphors), 328–40 (other tropes) (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter SMITH,
ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING].
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corrected by the empirical studies of behavioral social sciences,
cognitive studies, and brain science.
My examination of
contemporary law and economics as a rhetorical perspective
requires the discussion of the following theses:
•

Law and economics is inherently rhetorical and uses its
own rhetoric to persuade the members of the law and
economics discourse community as well as the legal
community as a whole.

•

Law and economics uses a unique combination of modes of
persuasion as rhetorical topoi and tropes—the rhetorical
canons of law and economics—which are:
o Mathematical and scientific methods of analysis and
demonstration;
o The characterization of legal phenomena as incentives
and costs,
o The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency; and
o Rational choice theory as corrected by the modern
behavioral social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain
science.

The rhetorical canons of law and economics alone did not
cause the Great Recession. Canons of rhetoric are tools for legal
discourse, not universal goals and not perfect solutions. Law and
economics provides a rhetorical lens through which a legal author
might examine and improve the persuasiveness of her discourse
regarding the economy, governmental regulation, or any other
topic of the law. But a lens, like any other tool, is only as good as
its user. My conclusion is that the rhetorical canons of law and
economics can be used to create meaning and inspire imagination
in legal discourse beyond the economic analysis of law, but the
choice to employ the canons must be made with regard to the
rhetorical concept of ethos and the needs, demands, and limitations
of the rhetorical situation at hand.

10
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I. THE RHETORICAL NATURE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

A. Law and Economics is Inherently Rhetorical
Law and economics, like all disciplines of academic inquiry
and study, uses rhetoric to explain and justify its assumptions,
models, paradigms, assertions, and predictions.14 To understand
the assertion represented by the sub-heading of this section—law
and economics is inherently rhetorical—one must understand the
nature of rhetoric: Rhetoric is the “discovery and transmission of
insight and knowledge.”15 Rhetoric is the discipline that examines
“ways of winning others over to our views, and of justifying those
views to ourselves as well as others, when the question of how
things in the world ought to work is contested or contestable.”16
14

See McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra note 3, at 760. As
one scholar states:
[W]e are now invited to think hard about the rhetoric of everything;
“the rhetoric of philosophy,” “the rhetoric of sociology,” “the rhetoric
of religion,” even “the rhetoric of science.” Though these rhetorics are
not all of the same kind, we should realize that all of these fields
depend on rhetoric in their arguments. Most of them are in fact
grappling with rhetorical issues, as they debate their professional
claims.
WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF RHETORIC: THE QUEST FOR EFFECTIVE
COMMUNICATION xii (2004) [hereinafter BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF RHETORIC]
(emphasis in original).
15
Francis J. Mootz, III, Law in Flux: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Legal
Argumentation, and The Natural Law Tradition, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311,
317 (1999) (quoting Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Expressive Power of Language,
107 PUBLICATIONS MOD. LANGUAGE ASS'N AM. 348 (1992)). See also James
Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and
Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 695 (1985) [hereinafter White, Law as
Rhetoric]:
Like law, rhetoric invents; and, like law, it invents out of something
rather than out of nothing. It always starts in a particular culture and
among particular people. There is always one speaker addressing others
in a particular situation, about concerns that are real and important to
somebody, and speaking a particular language. Rhetoric always takes
place with given materials.
Id.
16
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 7. See also White, Law as Rhetoric,
supra note 13, at 684 (rhetoric establishes, maintains, and transforms the
community and the culture); James Boyd White, A Symposium: The Theology of
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“Rhetoric is primarily a verbal, situationally contingent, epistemic
art that is both philosophical and practical and gives rise to
potentially active texts.”17 Much of the scholarly attention within
the discipline of rhetoric has been directed to effective
communication with a particular focus on techniques for
persuasive communication and argumentation; thus, many familiar
definitions of rhetoric revolve around persuasion in discourse.18
In this Article, I am referring to the academic study of rhetoric,
both in its classical19 and contemporary20 forms. Rhetoric as the
the Practice of Law, February 14, 2002 Roundtable Discussion, 53 MERCER L.
REV. 1087, 1090 (2002) (“[T]he minute we begin to think and talk about
anything at all we live in the world of language, a world of contingent resources
for thought and speech, and rhetoric is a perfectly good term for how we do
that.”).
17
William A. Covino & David A. Joliffe, What is Rhetoric?, in RHETORIC:
CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS, BOUNDARIES 5 (1995).
18
See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 1355B
(George A. Kennedy trans., 1991); ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, bk. 1, ch. 2 (W.
Rhys Roberts trans. 1965), available at http://www.public.iastate.edu/~honeyl/
Rhetoric/ (last accessed Nov. 22, 2010) (Lee Honeycutt ed.) [hereinafter
ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC] (“Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of
observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.”); JOHN J.
MAKAY, SPEAKING WITH AN AUDIENCE: COMMUNICATING IDEAS AND
ATTITUDES 9 (3d ed. 1984) (“Rhetoric is defined ‘as the process of human
communication in which a speaker sorts, selects, and sends symbols for the
specific purpose of evoking a precise response’ from an audience.”); KRISTEN K.
ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF ANALYSIS AND PERSUASION 9 (2009) [hereinafter ROBBINSTISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS] (“[R]hetoric here refers to the art of
persuasion through eloquent, inventive, and strategically organized discourse,
both oral and written.”); Gerald Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal
Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 1546 n.14 (1990) (“By ‘rhetoric,’ I mean the
discipline . . . in which the objects of formal study are the conventions of
discourse and argument.”).
19
“Classical rhetoric” was begun in the fifth century B.C.E. and continued on
and perfected over the course of the next 1,000 years of Greco-Roman history
by Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. See CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10,
at 15–16, 18–19. Even after this reign as the defining study of public discourse
in classical times, the scholarship and teachings of classical rhetoric were
followed as the dominant discipline for developing legal arguments until the
first quarter of the nineteenth century. See id. at 2, 15. The origin of classical
rhetoric as a discipline devoted to the study of legal discourse and argumentation
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is traced to Corax of Syracuse. See, e.g., Michael Frost, Introduction to
Classical Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 613, 615
(1999) [hereinafter Frost, Lost Heritage]. The early tenets of the discipline were
critiqued by Socrates and by Socrates’ student, Plato, see infra note 19, and
subsequently they were refined by Plato’s student, Aristotle. See JOHN H.
MACKIN, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR MODERN DISCOURSE vii, 6–7, 17–18, 26
(1969). The most important writings of classical rhetoric are those of Aristotle,
ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 16, Cicero, MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO,
DE INVENTIONE 93, 104 (H.M. Hubbell trans., 1949); MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO,
DE ORATORE (E.W. Sutton trans., 1942), and Quintilian, 1 MARIUS FABIUS
QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA 273 (H.E. Butler trans., 1954), which
together define the canons of the discipline that serve as a rhetorical lens on
legal discourse.
20
The contemporary period of rhetoric begins in the twentieth century. Major
movements in thought have broadened the study of rhetoric to include all
aspects of communication, ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS,
supra note 16, at 61, including linguistics, ethics and persuasion, practical
reasoning, human motivation, composition theories, cognitive studies, and
socio-epistemic studies. Id. at 61–82. See, e.g., ROLAND BARTHES, ELEMENTS
OF SEMIOLOGY (Annette Lavers & Colin Smith trans., 1968) (language as
symbols); KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES (1969) [hereinafter
BURKE, GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES] (impact of culture); KENNETH BURKE, A
RHETORIC OF MOTIVES (1950) [hereinafter BURKE, RHETORIC OF MOTIVES]
(impact of culture); UMBERTO ECO, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS (1976) (language
as symbols); MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS
OF MAN (1996) (modern media studies); C. K. OGDEN & I.A. RICHARDS, THE
MEANING OF MEANING (1972) (language and meaning); I.A. RICHARDS, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC (1936) (language and meaning); RICHARD M.
WEAVER, THE ETHICS OF RHETORIC (1953) (ethics); Lloyd F. Bitzer, The
Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 6–8, 389–92 (1968) [hereinafter
Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation] (the impact of situation). Over time, the
cognitive rhetoric group divided into the process theory cognitivists, who
believe that the study of rhetoric should focus on the process of writing, a
recursive rather than linear creative process, that teaches the writer how to
reason and persuade and improve their communication by examining each stage
of the writing process, see ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS,
supra note 16, at 79, and the discourse community cognitivists, who believe the
study of rhetoric is a study of the writer’s assimilation into and acceptance of the
tenets, vocabulary, and expectations of a discourse community, such as the legal
writing discourse community. See, e.g., id. The socio-epistemic group
combines social theories of community with epistemological theories of learning
to form a theory of communication that considers the interaction of speaker,
subject matter, and audience. See id. at 81.
The common thread among these the schools of thought in the developing
discipline of contemporary rhetoric was a shift in thinking on the nature of
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study of persuasion and argument has a noble and classical
tradition, but the discipline has had difficulty shaking off a
common but enduring slur that is traced to ancient sources:
Socrates and Plato described the early study and practice of
rhetoric by the ancient Greek Sophists as the art of flattery and
trickery,21 and throughout the ages the slur has stuck. I emphasize
that this slur is not the subject of my study here. Rhetoric, the
academic discipline, is not the study of hollow speech, not puffery
designed to prop up specious assertions, not hyperbole employed
to distract an audience from the truths or falsities of the speakers’
knowledge and truth. Kristen K. Robbins, Philosophy v. Rhetoric in Legal
Education: Understanding the Schism Between Doctrinal and Legal Writing
Faculty, 3 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 108, 123 (2006) [hereinafter
ROBBINS, PHILOSOPHY V. RHETORIC]. Beginning in the 1950s, Stephen Toulmin
and Chaim Perelman asserted that truth is relative. Id. See, e.g., STEPHEN E.
TOULMIN, USES OF ARGUMENT (updated ed. 2003) [hereinafter TOULMIN, USES
OF ARGUMENT]; CHAIM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC (William
Kluback trans., 1982) [hereinafter PERELMAN, REALM OF RHETORIC];
PERELMAN & OBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 7. Toulmin argued that people in
everyday life do not use Aristotelian logic to establish conclusive proof, but
"informal logic" to reason and to acquire knowledge. TOULMIN, INTRODUCTION
TO REASONING, supra note 7, at 94–134. The knowledge acquired and the
arguments made are only probable, not absolute. Id. Like Toulmin, Perelman
argued that appeals to reason lead only to probable truths: “the appeal to reason
must be identified not as an appeal to a single truth but instead as an appeal for
the adherence of an audience. . . .” CHAIM PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC: A
THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASONING, GREAT IDEAS TODAY 234–52 (1970) (as
reprinted in JAMES L. GOLDEN ET AL., THE RHETORIC OF WESTERN THOUGHT
234–52 (6th ed. 1997)). From these beginnings, three contemporary theories of
rhetoric arose to focus on the construction of meaning, the creation of
arguments, and the processes that allow the creation of meaning and
argumentation. See Linda Levine & Kurt M. Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor,
43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 108, 118–21 (1993). These are: Modern Argument Theory,
Writing as a Process Theory, and the Theory of Discourse Communities. See
Michael Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 139.
21
Socrates did not devote his time to the publication of works, so we rely on
Plato whose writings purport to represent Socrates’ criticisms of rhetoric in such
famous dialogues as PLATO, PHAEDRUS, http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/
dialogues/7_phaedrus.htm (last accessed Dec. 27, 2010), PLATO, GORGIAS,
http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/dialogues/15_gorgias.htm (last accessed
Dec. 27, 2010), and PLATO, PHAEDO, http://www.classicallibrary.org/plato/
dialogues/14_phaedo.htm (last accessed Dec. 27, 2010).
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position.22 In short, it is nothing like the meaning of the
commonplace phrase, “mere rhetoric.”23 I am not examining law
and economics as a scheme of flattery and trickery but rather as a
discipline with a well-developed system of argumentation and
persuasion that has lessons for legal discourse beyond the realm of
economic analysis of law.
B. Excerpts from the History of the Rhetoric of Law and
Economics
The discipline of economics is rhetorical,24 and the discipline
of law and economics is rhetorical, too.25 Adam Smith, the
honorary father of economics, apparently understood the rhetorical
imperatives of economics and the law when, in his Lectures on
Jurisprudence concerning principle in the human mind and the
division of labor, he commented on the topic of exchanges and
self-interest:
The offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have so
plain and simple a meaning, is in reality offering an
22

See, e.g., KARLYN KOHRS CAMPBELL, THE RHETORICAL ACT 3–4 (1982);
Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetorical Stance, in Toward a New Rhetoric, 14 C.
COMPOSITION & COMM. 139, 139 (1963) [hereinafter Booth, The Rhetorical
Stance]; Wayne C. Booth, The Idea of a University as Seen by a Rhetorician,
1987
Ryerson
Lecture,
University
of
Chicago,
available
at
http://home.uchicago.edu/~ahkissel/booth/booth.htm (last accessed Nov. 23,
2010) [hereinafter Booth, Idea of a University].
23
See BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF RHETORIC, supra note 12, at vii, x, 6–7;
Booth, The Rhetorical Stance, supra note 20, at 139; Eileen A. Scallen,
Evidence Law as Pragmatic Legal Rhetoric: Reconnecting Legal Scholarship,
Teaching and Ethics, 21 QUINNIPIAC. L. REV. 813, 817, 829 (2003).
24
See DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS xix–xx, 5 (2d
ed. 1998) [MCCLOSKEY, RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS] [Note that the author,
Donald N. McCloskey, became Deirdre N. McCloskey; the two names refer to
the same author, but in my citations I will use the name or names used at the
time of publication of the works cited herein]; see generally Arjo Klamer &
Donald N. McCloskey, Economics in the Human Conversation, in ARJO
KLAMER, DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY & ROBERT M. SOLOW, THE CONSEQUENCES
OF ECONOMIC RHETORIC 3–4, 11 (1988); DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY & DEIRDRE
N. MCCLOSKEY, KNOWLEDGE AND PERSUASION IN ECONOMICS 38–52 (1994).
25
MCCLOSKEY, RHETORIC OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 3, at 760.
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argument to persuade one to do so and so for it is in his
interest. . . . Men always endevour [sic] to persuade others
to be of their opinion even when the matter is of no
consequence to them. . . . And in this manner every one is
practicing oratory on others thro [sic] the whole of his
life.”26
Robert L. Heilbroner interprets Smith to mean that “the basis for
economic relationships lies not in a disinterested calculation of
advantages, but in the ‘faculties of reason and speech’ that underlie
the capacity for persuasion.”27
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who is quoted in Cooter and Ulen’s
seminal text on law and economics,28 held that:
For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may
be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the
man of statistics and master of economics. . . . We learn
that for everything we have to give up something else, and
we are taught to set the advantage we gain against the other
advantage we lose, and to know what we are doing when
we elect.29
Judge Richard Posner summarizes the foundational rhetoric of
law and economics as follows:
[T]he most interesting aspect of the law and economics
movement has been its aspiration to place the study of law
on a scientific basis, with coherent theory, precise
hypotheses deduced from the theory, and empirical tests of
the hypotheses. Law is . . . amenable to scientific study.
Economics is the most advanced of the social sciences, and
26

Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, as quoted in Robert L. Heilbroner,
Rhetoric and Idealogy, in ARJO KLAMER, DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY & ROBERT
M. SOLOW, THE CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC RHETORIC at 38 (1988)
[hereinafter Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy].
27
Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra note 24, at 38.
28
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2.
29
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469,
474 (1897), quoted in COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 1.
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the legal system contains many parallels to and overlaps
with the systems that economists have studied
successfully.30
[The economic] approach enables the law to be seen,
grasped, and studied as a system—a system that economic
analysis can illuminate, reveal as coherent, and in places
improve. By the same token, the approach enables
economics to be seen as a tool for understanding and
reforming social practices, rather than merely as a formal
system of daunting mathematical complexity.31

C. The Nature of the Rhetoric of Law and Economics
Law and economics is a discipline whose persuasion is built
from the application of scientific analyses—especially
mathematics and the quantitative analysis of empirical data—to
social problems.32 Law is a discipline that attempts to deal with
social problems, and legal issues and the social conditions created
or imposed or perpetuated by the state of the law are problems or
conditions that may be subjected to economic analyses “with

30

Richard A. Posner, Foreword, to MICHAEL FAURE & ROGER VAN DEN
BERGH, ESSAYS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 5, 5 (1989) [hereinafter Posner,
Foreword], quoted in COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 1.
31
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 2, at xxi.
32
Heilbroner states:
Economics prides itself on its sciencelike character, and economists on
their ability to speak like scientists, without color, passion, or values,
preferably in the language of mathematics. . . . [M]ost [economics]
articles are “written” in matrix algebra, complex econometrics, formal
lemmas, and four-quadrant diagrammatics.
They would be
incomprehensible to anyone not trained in the vocabulary and
techniques of advanced economics . . . [T]he language of formalism
and mathematics is still a language, and therefore inescapably
“rhetorical.”
Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra note 25, at 38–39. See also Herbert
M. Kritzer, The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law: Conflicting Norms in
the Courtroom, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 42–43, 59 (2009).
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coherent theory, precise hypotheses deduced from the theory, and
empirical tests of the hypotheses.”33
Economics provides scientific theories to predict the effects of
legal rules on behavior that surpasses mere intuition, logic, or
common sense concerning human behavior.34 The theories are
behavioral theories that seek to predict how people will respond to
laws when laws are viewed as a system of incentives.35 Legal
economists assert that economics is a persuasive rhetorical lens on
the law because it has mathematically precise theories (price
theory and game theory) and empirically sound methods (statistics
and econometrics) of analyzing the effects of legal rules and
sanctions (viewed as incentives, prices, or costs) on (presumptively
rational) human behavior to achieve desirable (efficient) results for
individuals and for society.36
II. THE RHETORICAL CANONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
A. The Four Canons
If law and economics is inherently rhetorical, then what is the
rhetorical nature of this discipline when used as a rhetorical lens in
the law? I start with my summary of the rhetoric of the discipline
introduced earlier: Economics combines mathematically precise
theories and empirically sound methods of analyzing the effects of
incentives and costs on presumptively rational human behavior to
achieve efficient results for individuals and for society.37 From
this, I derive the four canons of law and economics rhetoric:
33

Posner, Foreword, supra note 28, at 5.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 3, 4.
35
See id. at 4.
36
See id. at 3, 4, 5. See also JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 2
(4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS]; Kritzer, supra
note 30, at 42–43, 59.
37
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 3, 4, 5. The rhetorician James Boyd
White channeled the rhetoric of law and economics when he characterized the
legal system in the following way: “The overriding metaphor is that of the
machine; the overriding value is that of efficiency, conceived of as the
attainment of certain ends with the smallest possible costs.” James Boyd White,
Rhetoric and Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, in THE RHETORIC
34

18

[FEBRUARY 2012]

Mathematics and Science
The primacy of mathematical and scientific methods of
analysis and demonstration38
Incentives and Costs
The characterization of law and the legal system in the
language of incentives and costs 39
Efficiency
The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency40
Contemporary Theory of Rational Choice
The contemporary rational choice theory as corrected by
modern behavioral social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain
science41
Each of four canons of law and economics are used both as
topics of invention and arrangement and tropes of style in
persuasive discourse. The canons represent the fundamental
assumptions upon and from which propositions regarding law and
economics will be measured as persuasive in both conception and
design and according to which theses concerning law and
economics will be accepted as reliable and authoritative by the
members of the law and economics discipline42—in other words,
OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES: LANGUAGE AND ARGUMENT IN SCHOLARSHIP AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 298, 300 (John S. Nelson et al. eds., 1987) (quoted in Levine &
Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, supra note 18, at 114).
38
Discussed in Part II.A.1, infra.
39
Discussed in Part II.A.2, infra.
40
Discussed in Part II.A.3, infra.
41
Discussed in Part II.A.4, infra.
42
The sources I have consulted to derive these four canons are many and
varied, but for general reference, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 2, 3, 4, 5,
41–43; POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 3–4, 9, 13, 21,
24–25, 495–96; Grant M. Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, Law and Economics after
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by the members of the law and economics discourse community.43
Therefore, these canons are described as rhetorical canons of law
and economics.
B. The Interaction of the Rhetorical Canons of Law and
Economics
Canons of rhetoric are customarily expressed or depicted in a
manner that reflects the interaction of the canons in a persuasive
exercise; all of the canons work together and simultaneously to
affect the persuasiveness of the discourse of the discipline or
activity. Each canon also simultaneously affects the operation of
the other canons, making them more or less persuasive. In
classical rhetoric, the three canons of invention (aspects of
persuasion that must be devised or “invented” by the author or
speaker) known as logos, ethos, and pathos,44 are often depicted as
a rhetorical triangle to suggest the interaction of the factors one to
another and the combined impact on the recipient of the discourse:

Behavioral Economics, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 629 (2007); and the sources cited in
subsections 1–4 of this section.
43
“Discourse community” is a term that grounds this discussion as to the
rhetoric of law and economics. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding
Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 419–38 (1995)
(economic representing a change in discourse); Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential
Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 611 & n.53 (1989) (describing
the discourse of law and economics).
44
See CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 71–84; KENNEDY, CLASSICAL
RHETORIC, supra note 52, at 68, 75, 82, 89; Covino & Joliffe, supra note 15, at
17, 52; Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 17, at 617–18; Michael Frost, GrecoRoman Legal Analysis: The Topics of Invention, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 107, 127
(1992) [hereinafter Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis]; Robin Smith,
Aristotle's Logic, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Fall 2004
ed.), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
sum2002/entries/aristotle-logic/ (last accessed Jan. 2, 2011) (last substantive edit
Oct. 5, 2000).
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2012

LOGOS

PATHOS

ETHOS

With regard to the classical modes of invention, Jakob Wisse
presents the concept as a linear flow
flow-chart:45

Author

Message

Audience

• Ethos

• Logos

• Pathos

James Kinneavy identifies these terms as Encoder – Signal –
Decoder, linking the author, the language or message, and the
reader or audience to reality.46 The author projects his ethos along
with or, in optimal circumstance, as part of the logos of the
message soo as to influence the pathos of the audience.47
The rhetorical pathways are fundamentally pragmatic.48
Aristotle sought to remind advocates that an argument is not oneone
dimensional. The most logically constructed argument still will
45

WISSE, supra note 44, at 8.
See JAMES L. KINNEAVY, A THEORY OF DISCOURSE: THE AIMS OF
DISCOURSE 19 (1971) [[hereinafter KINNEAVY, THEORY OF DISCOURSE]; Linda
L. Berger, A Reflective Rhetorical Model: The Legal Writing Teacher as Reader
and Writer, 6 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 57, 67 (2000); Phelps, supra note 8,, at
1091.
47
WISSE, supra note 44, at 7–8.
48
See Frost, Lost Heritage
Heritage, supra note 17, at 614, 624, 625, 627; Eileen A.
Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence
Evidence,, 44
AM. U. L. REV. 1717, 1728
1728–29 (1995).
46
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not persuade an audience if the audience questions the knowledge,
skill, or credibility of the author. Similarly, the most respected
author whose reputation is beyond question still will not win the
day if her argument is riddled with logical fallacies and comes
apart at the seams with a single, gentle tug at one of its logical
flaws. An ironclad argument may be delivered in such a way as to
antagonize the audience, or the effect of the argument may be
squandered if the audience begins to question the integrity and
credibility of the author.49
The four canons of law and economics rhetoric interact
together at the same time and toward the same audience. Proper
economic discourse incorporates each canon for the persuasion of
the audience. There is a connection and interaction in the
discourse of each canon to the others that influences the persuasion
of the audience—one cannot alter or abandon the canons of
efficiency, mathematical and scientific certainty, response to
incentives, and even rational choice without affecting the
persuasiveness and effectiveness of the economic discourse. An
incorrect, overstated, or deceptive message regarding one canon
puts the others at risk of suspicion or rejection by the audience. As
with classical rhetorical modes of invention, the interaction of the
canons of law and economics may be depicted visually, although
with four canons it shall be a rhetorical diamond, not a triangle:

49

See generally CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 72–73; Frost, Ethos,
Pathos & Legal Audience, supra note 45.
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2012
DISCOURSE DIAMOND of the RHETORICAL CANONS of
LAW AND ECONOMICS

INVENTION,
ARRANGEMENT
& STYLE

INVENTION,
N,
ARRANGEMENT
& STYLE

SPEAKER

Efficiency

SITUATION

MESSAGE
Math and
Science

Incentives
and Costs

Rational
Choice

INVENTION,
ARRANGEMENT
& STYLE

AUDIENCE

INVENTION,
ARRANGEMENT
& STYLE

In modern argument theory, the author of the discourse
(Speaker)) codes the discourse ((Message)) for a particular receiver
(Audience)) according to the conditions, requirements, and
limitations of the context of the discourse ((Situation).
). In law and
economics rhetorical discourse, the Speaker’s purpose is most
closely aligned with the canon of Efficiency, the Message to
achieve an efficient purpose is coded in the language of Incentives
ncentives
and Costs and is framed for the needs of the Audience according to
the Rational Choice Theory
Theory, and the means used are chosen in
reference to the rhetorical Situation with a distinct pr
preference
eference for
the methods of Mathematics and Science. Therefore, tthe rhetorical
orical
diamond of the canons of law and economics is aligned to depict
the flow of the discourse wherein each canon feeds into and
simultaneously draws from the other canons in alignment
ent with the
components of modern argument theory.
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1. The Primacy of Mathematical and Scientific Methods of
Analysis and Demonstration
The practitioners of law and economics—those who follow the
conventional and the contemporary approaches—rely on the
inherent persuasiveness of mathematics and the methodologies of
scientific proof both as a method of analysis and as a form for the
demonstration50 of the analysis.51 Members of the economic
disciplines hold themselves out as scientists, applying logical,
scientific deduction and induction to prove propositions.52 The
syllogism and enthymeme (deductive forms) and the induction and
example (inductive forms) are topoi of invention and arrangement
50

Demonstration and dialectic are the two principle forms of reasoning
recognized by Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 16, at Book
I, ch. 1 at 1354a; GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND ITS
CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR TRADITION FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 80
(1999) [hereinafter KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC]. See also P. CHRISTOPHER
SMITH, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ORIGINAL ARGUMENT: DEMONSTRATION,
DIALECTIC, RHETORIC (1998). Rhetoric is the form of demonstration used in
argumentative persuasion or “continuous discourse,” whereas dialectic is more
appropriate to debate.
KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC, supra at 66.
Demonstration provides the rhetorical process of arrangement with two
paradigms of deductive reasoning, sullogismos (syllogisms) and enthumema
(enthymemes), CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 38–60; KENNEDY,
CLASSICAL RHETORIC, supra, at 83–84; Christof Rapp, Aristotle's Rhetoric, in
THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Summer 2002 ed.), Edward N.
Zalta (ed.), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/
aristotle-rhetoric/ (accessed Feb. 7, 2008) (last substantive edit May 2, 2002),
and two paradigms of inductive reasoning, the induction and the example. See
ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 16, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b; Brett G.
Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733, 752
& n.58 (2004); Robert H. Schmidt, The Influence of the Legal Paradigm on the
Development of Logic, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 367, 372–73 (1999).
51
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 3, 4; Robert L. Heilbroner, Rhetoric
and Idealogy, supra note 24, at 38–39; Kritzer, supra note 30, at 42–43, 59.
52
GEORGE PÓLYA, INDUCTION AND ANALOGY IN MATHEMATICS: VOLUME I
OF MATHEMATICS AND PLAUSIBLE REASONING v–vi (1954); McCloskey,
Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra note 3, at 752, 760. The pros and cons
of this rhetorical imperative are a lively topic of debate, and one that is growing
in the wake of the economic meltdown of 2009–10. E.g., Samuel Gregg, Smith
versus Keynes: Economics and Political Economy in the Post-Crisis Era, 33
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443, 445, 451–52, 455–56 (2010).
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in science, mathematics, and rhetorical demonstration.53
Contemporary law and economics assumes and advocates the
rhetorical primacy of scientific and mathematical methods of
analysis in forming hypotheses, designing the methods for testing
the hypotheses, and analyzing the data, statistics, and information
collected to test the hypotheses.54 Law and economics also
assumes the rhetorical primacy of scientific and mathematical
forms in discourse to demonstrate the analyses and communicate
its theses about human behavior.55
In contemporary law and economics, predictions and
prescriptions are informed by scientific testing and mathematical
analysis of data not just by logic, intuition, common sense,
ideology, or philosophy.56 The methods of examination and the
assumptions made that are supported by the rhetoric of
53

The structural form of pure logic and scientific or mathematical proof is the
syllogism, while the structural form of rhetorical demonstration and legal
argument is the enthymeme. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 16, at
Bk. I, ch. 1, at 1355a. The deductive structure of the syllogism and enthymeme
provides the framework for each of the organizational paradigms of legal
discourse, including IRAC, IREAC, and TREAT. LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL
WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION, chs. 10, 11, 19, 20 (5th ed.
2010) (discussing IREAC and variations for objective and persuasive discourse);
MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY H. DESANCTIS, LEGAL WRITING AND
ANALYSIS, chs. 2, 6, 7 (2009) (discussing IRAC and TREAT); James M.
Boland, Legal Writing Programs and Professionalism: Legal Writing Professors
Can Join the Academic Club, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 711, 719–23 (2006)
(discussing IRAC and IREAC); Kristen K. Robbins, Paradigm Lost:
Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 VT. L. REV.
483, 484–87, 492 (2003) [hereinafter Robbins, Paradigm Lost] (discussing
IRAC and IREAC).
54
See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 15–16; Posner,
Foreword, supra note 28, at 5; Richard A. Posner, Volume One of The Journal
of Legal Studies—An Afterword, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 437 (1972) [hereinafter
Posner, Afterword]. See also Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and
Coevolution: The Web of Law, Management Theory, and Law Related Services
at the Millennium, 66 TENN. L. REV. 137, 190 n.493 (1998); Gary Minda, supra
note 51, at 611–12.
55
See Bryant G. Garth, Strategic Research in Law and Society, 18 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 57, 59 (1990)); Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or
Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 912 (1980).
56
E.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 3, 4, 5.
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contemporary law and economics and law and behavioral science
are those that are susceptible to scientific proof through the
application of mathematical and scientific methods of analysis of
empirical data to confirm or rebut hypotheses and assumptions
about human behavior in the context of the law.57 But the
propositions chosen to be proved, and especially the design of the
experiments or studies that will be adequate and reliable to prove
the propositions, rely on rhetoric—the rhetoric being that which is
held within the disciplines to be reasonable, reliable, and provable
using a scientific, mathematical, or quantitative methodology.58
Mathematics is a language, and like any other language, is
rhetorical.59 Mathematics is a wonderful tool of analysis, but the
elevation of mathematical forms and models as the primary
method of demonstration in economic rhetoric comes with a
warning for the application of this trope in general legal discourse:
it is not realistic to assume that every legal issue and social
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See, e.g., HOWELL E. JACKSON, LOUIS KAPLOW ET AL., ANALYTICAL
METHODS FOR LAWYERS 372, 375–77 (2003).
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Compare Mark R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenberg, On Formally
Undecidable Propositions of Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the Implications of
Metamathematics, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1439 (1992); and Anthony T. Kronman,
Rhetoric, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 677, 678–79, 682 (1999), and John M. Rogers &
Robert E. Molzon, Some Lessons about the Law from Self-Referential Problems
in Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. REV. 992 (1992), with David R. Dow, Godel and
Langdell - A Reply to Brown and Greenberg's Use of Mathematics in Legal
Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 707 (1993), and Kevin W. Saunders, Realism,
Ratiocination, and Rules, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 219 (1993); and Mike Townsend,
Implications of Foundational Crises in Mathematics: A Case Study in
Interdisciplinary Legal Research, 71 WASH. L. REV. 51, 54, 61–63, 121–124
(1996) [hereinafter Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises].
59
See David N. Haynes, The Language and Logic of Law: A Case Study, 35
U. MIAMI L. REV. 183, 186–87, 220 (1981); Donald N. McCloskey, The
Lawyerly Rhetoric of Coase's The Nature Of The Firm, 18 J. CORP. L. 425, 425–
26, 428–31 (1993); Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises, supra note
60, at 62–63, 141; Mike Townsend & Thomas Richardson, Probability and
Statistics in the Legal Curriculum: A Case Study in Disciplinary Aspects of
Interdisciplinarity, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 447, 483–84 (2002); Joan C. Williams,
Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New
Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 439 (1987).
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condition can be subjected to mathematical analysis.60 Albert
Einstein once said, “As far as the laws of mathematics refer to
reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do
not refer to reality.”61
The very word, proof, as in what the economist or behavioral
scientist has proved, is inherently rhetorical in nature,62 and it is a
powerfully persuasive word. An assertion that something is
proved or even can be proved is a rhetorical assertion because,
even in mathematics, there are some assertions and propositions
that cannot be proved within a known mathematical system.63 The
differences in opinions as to what are reasonable, reliable, and
provable assumptions and predictions in economics using a
scientific, mathematical, or quantitative methodology have led to
internal divisions within the law and economics community, and
led directly to the creation of the law and behavioral science
discipline, as discussed in Part II.A.4 below.
The rhetorical use of mathematical forms in law and
economics—the use of mathematics as a trope of arrangement and
style in the demonstration—is to this author the most intriguing
aspect of this canon, and the most delicate topic from which to
draw prescriptions for legal discourse. The appearance of
mathematical certainty in law and economics rhetoric is an
60

See generally Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law
and Economics, and Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379,
1383–84 (2010); Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A
Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871, 881, 889–90 (1989); Laurence H.
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1331–32 (1971).
61
Albert Einstein, quoted in F. CAPRA, THE TAO OF PHYSICS 27 (1975).
62
McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra note 3, at 752, 760.
63
See Anthony D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation
of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561, 597 (1989); Steven P. Goldberg, On Legal and
Mathematical Reasoning, 22 JURIMETRICS 83, 87 n.26 (1981); Susan K. Houser,
Metaethics and the Overlapping Consensus, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1152
(1993); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 136 n.3
(1992); Rudolph J. Peritz, Computer Data and Reliability: A Call for
Authentication of Business Records Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 80
Nw. U. L. Rev. 956, 999 n.214 (1986); Roy Stone, Affinities and Antinomies in
Jurisprudence, 1964 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 266, 281.
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attractive tool, but is it too seductive? Critics have challenged legal
economists for adopting complex mathematical formulae to
demonstrate findings the relevance of which to actual legal
problems and social conditions is said to be specious.64
Nevertheless, the a priori, ex ante, positivist application of
mathematical formulas to legal topics and problems has led the
practitioners of neoclassical law and economics to claim their
greatest successes.65 Unfortunately, this has come at a cost,
namely a string of mathematically verifiable prescriptions that
brought about policies that contributed to the severity of the Great
Recession.
I explained above that my purpose here is not to critique the
benefits or costs of the use of the canons of law and economics in
the economic analysis of law. My purpose is to explore the
application of these rhetorical canons in legal discourse generally.
On the one hand, mathematics is a language, and thus rhetorical,
and its particular form of persuasion is an appeal to certainty by the
open demonstration of the truth and logic of its workings.66 On the
other hand, mathematical forms of demonstration may be
employed to attempt to overcome “the difference between truth in
mathematics and truth in law—between logical truths and
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E.g., MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS, supra note 22, at 44–45;
Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra note 24, at 38; Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A
Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 485–90 (1987).
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POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at xix (championing
the unity, simplicity, and power, but also the subtlety, of economic principles);
James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, and
the Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15 L. & HIST. REV. 275,
287–88 (1997); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal
Policy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 4, 5 (1994) ("Assumptions about preference have
enabled neoclassical economics and public choice theory to describe both
private and public markets by means of mathematical models that have great
elegance and rhetorical power."); Richard Posner, The Sociology of the
Sociology of Law: A View from Economics, 2 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 265, 274
(1995).
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See MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 3, at
761, 763; Kronman, supra note 60, at 679; Schmidt, supra note 52, at 395–96.
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rhetorical or dialectical or polemical truths”67—by cloaking the
legal discourse in the rhetorical garb of mathematics68 and
science,69 making the findings appear to be more certain and
67

See Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and
Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604 (1983) (citing two of the most
influential modern rhetoricians, Kenneth Burke, Politics as Rhetoric, 93 ETHICS
45, 46–47 (1982); and CHAIM PERELMAN, JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT:
ESSAYS ON MORAL AND LEGAL REASONING 120–74 (1980); CHAIM PERELMAN,
THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE HUMANITIES 1–61, 117–33 (1979)). The
difference between formal logic and the absolute proof of the syllogism, and
informal logic used in everyday discourse to assert the most probable arguments
in everyday situations, is one of the primary impetuses that motivated the move
to contemporary schools of rhetoric building on the work of Burke and
Perelman. See also BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES, supra note 18; BURKE, A
RHETORIC OF MOTIVES, supra note 18; PERELMAN, REALM OF RHETORIC, supra
note 18; PERELMAN & OBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC, supra note 18.
Pigou, one of the forefathers of neoclassical law and economics, pointed out the
distinction between formal logic and pure mathematics on the one side and the
"realistic sciences" on the other, as to which economics was to be a realistic
science. A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 5 (4th ed. 1962) (“On the
one side are the sciences of formal logic and pure mathematics, whose function
it is to discover implications. On the other side are the realistic sciences, such as
physics, chemistry and biology, which are concerned with actualities.”).
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E.g., JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR., UNDER COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN
LEGAL-ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY (2007);
McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra note 3, at 753–54; Joseph
Vining, The Gift of Language, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1581, 1583–84 (1998).
See also Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein & Drazan Prelec, Coherent
Arbitrariness: Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences, 118 Q. J.
ECON. 73–106 (2003) (demonstrating how the illusion of stable, ordered
preferences can be created with arbitrary anchors); Gary Becker, Irrational
Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1, 4 (1962).
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MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS, supra note 22, at 147; Morton
J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905,
912 (1980); Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 478–81 (1974). The excessively persuasive
effect of scientific demonstration is a problem in non-economic legal settings,
too, such as evidence law. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE: DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE § 7.8, at 992
(1995) (“Scientific proof may suggest unwarranted certainty to lay factfinders,
especially if it comes dressed up in technical jargon, complicated mathematical
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to promise more than it delivers”); John William Strong, Language and Logic in
Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert Testimony by Restrictions of Function,
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absolute than they really are. It seems highly likely that
government policy was shifted because of the seeming certainly of
the formulas that supported law and economics’ prescriptions
regarding unregulated markets and government non-interference in
financial systems. This possibility sends a significant message of
caution for the ethos-minded use of mathematical and scientific
forms in general legal discourse.
2. The Characterization of Law and the Legal System in the
Language of Incentives and Costs
The rhetoric of traditional and contemporary law and
economics begins with a seminal insight of economics: that people
respond to incentives70 and that the law (legal rules and the legal
system) can create incentives that can influence human behavior in
one direction and can create disincentives that can influence
human behavior in the other direction.71 Legal rules and the legal
system can “encourage socially desirable conduct and discourage
undesirable conduct” by rewarding or subsidizing certain behavior
and punishing or taxing other behavior.72 Legal rules and the legal
Reliability, and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 367 n.81 (1992) (“There is virtual
unanimity among courts and commentators that evidence perceived by jurors to
be ‘scientific’ in nature will have particularly persuasive effect.”). See also
United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (scientific
evidence “assume[s] a posture of mythic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of
laymen”); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973)
(describing scientific testimony's “aura of special reliability and
trustworthiness”). But see Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions
Underlying the Debate About Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror
“Incompetence” and Scientific “Objectivity,” 25 CONN. L. REV. 1083 (1993)
(jurors are able to evaluate competing scientific and technical testimony).
70
Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 1054;
Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created
Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 987 (2009).
71
See Paul J. Heald & James E. Heald, Mindlessness and Law, 77 VA. L. REV.
1127, 1132 (1991); Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and
Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 412–14 (2005); Korobkin &
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 1043.
72
Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 1054. See
Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 164–65 (1996); Lior
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system can increase the costs of certain behavior or lesson the
costs of other behavior.73
The premise that people respond to incentives is rhetorical;74 it
is both an assumption and a presumption that shapes the
predictions that analysts using the methodology of law and
economics can make about the effects of law and the
recommendations that these analysts are willing to make about
changes to the law.75 Law and economics imported this assumption
from economics, along with the assumption that people react
rationally to incentives.76
Economists’ examination of human behavior within various
legal and social environments of the world involves the
characterization of many phenomena as either incentives or costs.77
Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal
Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1711 (2008); Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence
Via Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV.
343, 343–47 (1989).
73
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 84; Steven Garber,
Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and Economic
Outcomes, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 237, 284–86 (1998); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 1054; Peter Reuter, A Just Use of
Economics or Just Use Economics, 70 CAL. L. REV. 850, 853–54 (1982).
74
See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright
Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (2009) (discussing the rhetoric of incentives
in copyright law); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94
MICH. L. REV. 1197 (1996) (same).
75
See Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 1054;
Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies Versus Boundaries: Levels of Generality in
Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1781, 1795–96 & nn.42–44
(2003) (discussing “overadvocacy” of legal incentives).
76
Russell Korobkin, Possibility and Plausibility in Law and Economics, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 781, 795 (2005); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 1054; George Stigler, Economists and
Public Policy, 1982 REGULATION 13–16 (May–June 1982).
77
See Balganesh, supra note 77, at 1591–92; Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S.
Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe and the
United States, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1555, 1589–92 (2008); Owen D. Jones, TimeShifted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics
Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1141, 1141–42, 1198–99 (2001);
Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 1058.
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The canon of incentives and costs states that humans and human
institutions facing a choice in conditions of scarce resources (thus
requiring a choice) will act in ways that achieve or realize
(maximize) the incentives and avoid (minimize) the costs.78 When
the actor under examination is government, the rhetoric of the
discipline defines the benefits and rewards offered or imposed by
government as incentives and the costs imposed or perpetuated by
government as taxes or externalities.79 When the actors under
examination are private parties, the rhetoric of the discipline
defines incentives and costs in economic terms such as offers,
inducements, price, or rent.80 The presumption is that humans are
motivated to alter their behavior in response to incentives and
costs.81
The language of economics—cost, benefit, incentives,
disincentives, externalities, and economics—already is widely
embraced in the law. Courts and scholars alike have widely
embraced the language of incentives and costs in their discussions
of law and legal analysis as part of the general acceptance of
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POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 4; Philip B.
Heymann, The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 797, 829–30, 848–49 (1973); Francesco Parisi & Jonathan Klick,
Functional Law and Economics: The Search for Value-Neutral Principles of
Lawmaking, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 431, 448–49 (2004).
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APPROACH (1980); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 22;
Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1717, 1740 (1982); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Status and Incentive Aspects of
Judicial Decisions, 79 GEO. L.J. 1447, 1463–64 (1991).
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Joseph F. Brodley & Ching-to Albert Ma, Contract Penalties, Monopolizing
Strategies, and Antitrust Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1167–68 (1993);
Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the
Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV.
471, 492–94 (1988); Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and the
Standard Analysis of Monopoly Rent Seeking: A Generalizable Critique, a
“Sociological” Account, and Some Illustrative Stories, 78 IOWA L. REV. 327,
329–30 & n.3 (1993); Roger G. Noll, “Buyer Power” and Economic Policy, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 589, 600–01 (2005).
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POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 4; Korobkin, supra
note 79, at 781, 795; George Stigler, supra note 79, at 13–16.
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economic considerations in legal analysis, as suggested by the
following chart:
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This chart (a taxonomy, an economic-friendly demonstration of
data—a topos of arrangement or trope of style) indicates that the
language (i.e., the rhetoric) of costs and incentives is fairly
common in legal analysis among courts and in legal scholarship.
Legal authors—judges, scholars, and practitioners—already are
employing incentives and costs language in substantive legal
discourse with significant frequency. Every time an author writes
about a cost-benefit analysis, every time a change in the law is said
to “incentivize” certain conduct, every time a license or permit
application process is said to provide a disincentive to an activity,
82
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every time a change in procedural rules is said to impose an
“externality” on the cost of litigation, the author uses a rhetorical
trope of style (a figure of speech) to discuss laws and legal
conditions as incentives or costs in contexts that are not necessarily
business or contract settings or do not involve the calculation of
pecuniary sums or damages.89
The basic statement that humans respond favorably to
incentives and not favorably to costs disguises the rhetorical
complexity of this presumption when it comes to making
predictions about human behavior in legal situations and in
response to legal conditions. First, incentives or costs must be
designed, communicated, and recognized by the human actor or
institution; government must correctly design and communicate its
actions so as to offer the benefit or impose the tax that government
intends to offer to or impose on its audience of citizens, and private
actors must correctly design and communicate their actions so as to
offer the correct intended inducement or impose the intended price
or rent.90 Second, and equally important to the rhetoric of the
discipline, is the fact that the action must be perceived and
understood by the human audience, the object or recipient of
government’s or a private actor’s action, and what should be
perceived and understood as an incentive as opposed to a cost is
not always a simple process for humans.91
The rhetorical canon of incentives and cost is closely
associated with the canon of rational choice: the design,
communication, perception, and motivation concerning incentives
and costs require analysis and an understanding of the rhetorical
audience and the rhetorical situation.92 Scientific empirical analysis
89

See, e.g., THOMAS CONLEY, RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 15
(1990); Levine & Saunders, supra note 18, at 118–21; Fred A. Simpson &
Deborah J. Selden, When to Welcome Greeks Bearing Gifts—Aristotle and the
Rules of Evidence, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1009, 1011 (2003).
90
See infra Part II.A.4.
91
See infra Part II.A.4.
92
When is a situation “rhetorical”?—When the audience of the message in the
situation has the opportunity to alter reality. When the audience has no choice,
the situation is not rhetorical. A situation is made up of: subject—place—
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of human behavior indicates that there are limitations on humans’
abilities to understand and appreciate benefits and costs.93 These
limitations are assumed and represented in the rhetorical statement
that humans are creatures of “bounded” abilities—bounded
rationality, bounded ability to gather information, bounded
perception, and bounded cognition. These bounds limit humans’
abilities to perceive and understand the incentives and costs set
before them, which in turn complicates the predictions and
prescriptions of economists regarding the motivational effect of
incentives and costs.
This is the rhetorical “audience”
consideration with incentives and costs.
Separately, there is the mounting scientific empirical evidence
of the social, cognitive, and brain sciences that indicates that
humans are situational decision-makers.94 A consideration of the
rhetorical problems of audience and situation are commonplace in
rhetoric, and contemporary rhetoric in particular has covered this
ground well.95
time—audience—speaker. See Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, supra note 18,
at 6–8, 389–92; Greenhaw, supra note 8, at 875–80.
93
E.g., John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE
669 (1996); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 640
(1999); Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 4, at 1471; Symposium: The Legal
Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the
Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (1998); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325
(1990); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499,
1502 (1998) [hereinafter Langevoort, Behavioral Theories]; Herbert A. Simon,
A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 (1955).
94
See generally Hanson & Kysar, supra note 96, at 640; Hanson & Yosifon,
The Situation, supra note 5; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character,
supra note 1.
95
E.g., White, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 13, at 695:
Like law, rhetoric invents; and, like law, it invents out of something
rather than out of nothing. It always starts in a particular culture and
among particular people. There is always one speaker addressing others
in a particular situation, about concerns that are real and important to
somebody, and speaking a particular language. Rhetoric always takes
place with given materials.
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3. The Rhetorical Economic Concept of Efficiency
There are two kinds of efficiency in the rhetoric of law and
economics: (1) formal efficiency as a preference for simple,
elegant formulae and solutions, and (2) the substantive economic
concepts of efficiency as a standard and goal of law and policy.
Both modes employ a highly rhetorical turn. The adoption and
application of the rhetorical primacy of science and mathematics
carries other implications for the discipline, including, for
example, that a more efficient (elegant) solution to a problem is
preferred under the rhetoric of mathematics and science and
subsequently under the rhetoric of economics and the rhetoric of
law and economics.96 The formal desire for efficiency in structure
and form leads to a high priority for elegance and simplicity in the
equations and formulae of the discipline.97 Naturally, elegant and
effective formulae that are substantively correct make an important
impact regarding the understanding of economists, but I describe
this mode as offering a different layer of persuasion for noneconomists because non-economists can appreciate the
persuasiveness of an elegant formula and simple solution because
this mode of presentation promotes clarity and openness, revealing
the workings and falsifiability of the reasoning.
Id.; Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, supra note 18, at 6–8, 389–92; Greenhaw,
supra note 8, at 875–80.
The contemporary analysis of communication produces a formula for the
speaker’s invention of discourse crafted for a given situation: Exigence (a/k/a
the rhetorical problem, the reason for speaking, and the urgency thereof) +
Audience (mediators of change—those who may be moved from one point to
another in the situation) + Constraints (the physical or psychological limitations
or opportunities of the situation) = Fitting response (the speaker’s purpose and
objectives). See Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, supra note 18, at 6–8, 390–92;
Greenhaw, supra note 8, at 875–80. This model easily can be applied to
economic analysis—if the object of the incentive has no choice, then there is no
opportunity for theorizing rational choice of incentives in that situation.
96
“Mathematical elegance often becomes the primary goal, with usefulness in
the realm of law, that combines logic with human experience, a mere
afterthought.” Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at
1054.
97
See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 16;
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 4, 5 (1994).
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In substantive terms, law and economics assumes and
advocates efficiency over more abstract concepts of fairness,
morality, and justice.98 This is not to say that fairness, morality,
and justice are never incorporated into an economic analysis, but
that economists find it preferable to assume such concepts into the
rhetorical economic concepts of efficiency—in other words,
assuming for purposes of a model or prescription that a fair, moral,
and just solution will be more efficient according to one of the
economic conceptions of efficiency.99 Efficiency (or parsimony)
in the rhetoric of law and economics is not just a formal imperative
for methods and procedures of modeling paradigms and the
formulation of hypotheses and theses, but it also has been
advanced as a substantive and instrumental imperative in positive
examination of conditions, normative analysis of possible
conditions, and prescriptions for future conditions.100 Efficiency,
98

E.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Efficiency and Equity: What
Can Be Gained by Combining Coase and Rawls?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 329, 329–
30 (1998).
99
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HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 157 (1994); Michael I. Swygert & Katherine
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Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REV. 249, 284–86, 316–17 (1998). See generally KEN
BINMORE, PLAYING FAIR: GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1994);
KEN BINMORE, JUST PLAYING: GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
(1998); DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1996); HERVÉ MOULIN, COOPERATIVE
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YOUNG, EQUITY: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 8 (1994).
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See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 13–16;
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 3–6 (1993);
Robert D. Cooter, Law and the Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to
the Economic Analysis of Law and a Review of the Major Books, 29 UCLA L.
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minimum input.”); Frank I. Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses
of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 307, 309 (1979) [hereinafter
Michelman, Comment]; Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the
Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1032–35 (1978) [hereinafter
Michelman, Norms]; Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance:
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therefore, has become a rhetorical imperative in and of itself in law
and economics.101
The elevation of efficiency over other concepts associated with
the law, such as fairness, morality, and justice, makes the work of
law and economics simpler and easier in many ways,102 but more
difficult in other ways.103 The substantive meaning of efficiency in
the rhetoric of law and economics is a clever twist on a common
word to add a very specific, and nonintuitive meaning for
efficiency in law and economics—and not just one meaning. In
the rhetoric of economics, substantive and instrumental
“efficiency” is defined in three, carefully crafted ways: productive
efficiency (sometime referred to by the undistinguishing term of
economic efficiency), in which a process or action produces the
intended result with maximum utility and minimum costs;104
Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 345–46
(1984).
101
“Although efficiency need not be the sole or primary goal of legal policy,
economic analysis of law teaches that policymakers ignore the efficiency
implications of their actions at society's peril. Legal rights that are
unobjectionable in the abstract are not free but rather must be measured against
their opportunity costs.” Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra
note 4, at 1054 (inner citations omitted).
102
A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 3–4,
9–10 (2d ed. 1989) [POLINSKY, LAW AND ECONOMICS]; Richard A. Posner,
Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 301
(1979); Cass R. Sunstein, On Philosophy and Economics, 19 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 333, 335–36, 348 (2000).
103
E.g., Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 4, at 1508–09:
laws may be efficient solutions to the problems of organizing society
. . . [but] [t]he notion that laws emerge from considerations of
efficiency and conventional rent seeking would probably strike most
citizens as odd. . . . many laws on the books appear to be difficult to
justify on efficiency grounds (for example, those that prohibit mutually
beneficial exchanges without obvious externalities) and seem to benefit
groups that do not have much lobbying power (such as the poor or
middle class).
Id.
104
Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1025, 1028–29
(1987); R. Quentin Grafton, Dale Squires & Kevin J. Fox, Private Property and
Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource, 43 J. L. & ECON.
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Pareto efficiency105 (allocative efficiency), in which the situation
cannot be altered to benefit one of the parties in the situation
without making the other party worse off—better or worse off
referring to the individual, subjective perceptions and preferences
of the parties;106 and potential Pareto improvements or KaldorHicks efficiency, in which incremental gains in benefits or
incentives created by a change in action exceed incremental losses
or costs imposed by the change in action.107
The language of efficiency is intended to facilitate full and
complete communication to members of the economics discourse
community and facilitate a persuasive level of communication to
communicate and advocate the findings of the discipline to the
outside world. Within the discipline, the rhetoric of law and
economics assumes that it is easier to conceive of models of
efficiency and form hypotheses of efficiency and to test these
models and hypotheses of efficiency through scientific and
mathematical methods of analysis than it would be to test fairness,
morality, and justice using scientific and mathematical analyses.
The models and forms that are developed give the appearance of
rigorous scientific analysis that “proves” the hypotheses that a
certain course or change in law produces efficient results,
679, 690–91 (2000). See also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 17; WALTER
NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS
611–20 (9th ed. 2004).
105
See VILFREDO PARETO, 4 THE MIND AND SOCIETY: THE GENERAL FORM OF
SOCIETY 1459, 1465–69 (1907) (Andrew Bongiorno et al. trans., 1935) (1907);
VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1906) (Ann. S. Schwier
trans., 1971); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 12.
106
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 17; POLINSKY, LAW AND
ECONOMICS, supra note 105, at 7 n.4; POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW,
supra note 1, at 13, 14, 26; Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange and
Auction: Philosophical Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CAL. L.
REV. 221 (1980); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical & Political Bases of the
Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 491
(1980); Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). See also ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMICS 103–10, 433–35 (8th ed. 1920); ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 31–43 (1952); HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 160–71 (3d ed. 1992).
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See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 18.
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whichever of the three forms of “efficient” results are assumed in
the models and hypotheses.
The success or failure of models and hypotheses concerning
one or more of the economic definitions of efficiency is easier to
observe through scientific and mathematical methods of analysis of
statistics and econometric data than it would be to test a model or
hypothesis of fairness, morality, or justice. Success or failure is a
highly desirable observation of any practical study, and models and
hypotheses of fairness, morality, and justice may suffer from the
fact that they may be tautological and non-falsifiable within the
rhetorical definitions of fairness, morality, and justice in the law,
philosophy, or ethics.
However, rational humans embrace
concepts of fairness, morality, and justice, and act on them, which
complicates economics predictions and prescriptions as to the
effect of law and legal conditions. The result of prescriptions
concerning unregulated, unconstrained, but “efficient” financial
markets is revealed in stark detail in the Great Recession.
4. The Contemporary Theory of Rational Choice
Law and economics presumes that human actors in legal
situations are rational and will act in rational ways in response to
legal conditions. The early adopters of the law and economics
analysis of law accepted a rhetorical assumption that when faced
with choices, humans will respond rationally in making their
choices, rather than acting randomly and capriciously; most
importantly for the discipline of law and economics, it is assumed
that humans will act predictably.108 The rhetoric of this position is
known generally as rational choice theory.109
Over the last five decades, rational choice theory employed by
law and economics analysts has produced marked success in
explaining and predicting human behavior when humans are
confronted by incentives, costs, or opportunities, and many of
these successes have been applied to make accurate predictions of
108
See KOROBKIN & ULEN, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at
1055.
109
Id.
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the effect of existing laws or changes in the law on the behavior of
humans subject to the laws.110 The successes produced under the
rational choice theory lead some to argue that rational choice
theory, defined broadly enough, and shaped to encompass all areas
where predictions are reliable and verifiable and to exclude the
areas and phenomena where predictions are unreliable and
refutable, is all that an economic approach to the law requires.111
In fact, some argue that the “correction” applied to economics by
behavioral science—to reject many if not most of the assumptions
represented by the rational choice theory—means that a behavioral
approach to law and economics does not fit within the rhetoric of
economics or law and economics at all.112 They argue that analysts
of behavioral science may be applying psychology, or
sociocultural, or cognitive theories to the law, but they are not
applying economics.113 This is indeed a crisis within the rhetoric
of the discipline.
The definition of what it means to be “rational” in response to
legal conditions and the weight given to the presumption of
rationality differs depending on the legal situation that is being
studied and the legal economist that is studying the situation.
Cognitive science has indicated that situations affect decision
making in ways that are contrary to traditional rational choice
theory of maximizing self interest.114 A large part of the correction
in the rhetoric of traditional law and economics advanced by the
proponents of a behavioral approach to law and economics is a
correction in the definition of rationality and the weight given to
110

See id. at 1053–54.
Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1553–58 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Rational Choice].
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Id. at 1558 (“If there is any theory in their approach, it is not an economic
theory.”). See infra Part III.C.
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Posner, Rational Choice, supra note 116, at 1558 (“They take a
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analysis of law.”).
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See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5; Hanson &
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111

Great Recession and Rhetorical Canons of Law & Economics 41
the presumption of rationality in the face of various legal
conditions.115 The behavioral approach asserts that the definition
of rationality and its weight in making predictions about human
behavior in the face of legal conditions must be modified with the
knowledge and understanding gained from behavioral science,
which gives a clearer picture of the nature and limits of human
rationality in response to legal situations.
The acceptance or at least the acknowledgement that rational
choice is more bounded than traditional rational choice theories
and models have predicted presents a problem for the rhetoric of
the discipline and complexity in the use of rational choice theory
as a rhetorical lens for legal discourse. The rhetoric of the
discipline can redefine its theories and definitions of “rational” so
as to incorporate the empirical observations of seemingly nontraditional, irrational behavior in legal situations requiring a
choice.116 For example, in response to the ultimatum game
studies,117 “rational” as a definition may be modified from a strict
115

There is considerable debate within both the economics and law-andeconomics communities about precisely what rational choice theory is
and is not. As it is applied implicitly or explicitly in the law-andeconomics literature, however, it is understood alternatively as a
relatively weak, or thin, presumption that individuals act to maximize
their expected utility, however they define this, or as a relatively strong,
or thick, presumption that individuals act to maximize their selfinterest.
Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at 1055 (inner
citations omitted).
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Ultimatum game studies test the theory that when a person is assigned a
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something—the offeror keeps the remainder of the sum not offered, and the
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The studies belied this prediction by observing that offerees routinely rejected
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position that one will act to maximize selfish pecuniary interests to
a broader definition that one will act to maximize his or her own
interests of whatever kind, one interest being the motivation to be
and to be perceived as being fair in bargaining.
Whether the rational choice theory is definitional (e.g., humans
rationally make choices to maximize their ends),118 or based on a
conception that humans make choices to maximize their expected
utility from the choices made,119 or based on an assumption of
human self-interest,120 or humans’ motivation toward wealth
small offers, for example less than 20% of the sum, and offerors tended to offer
much larger sums, frequently in the range of 40–50% of the sum assigned.
Theories arising from these empirical data revolve around the concept of
fairness and the parties’ perception of what is fair in the situation—that offerees
will not accept an offer that is perceived to be unfair even though any offer, no
matter how small, increased their pecuniary well being, and offerors offered a
greater portion with an apparent motivation of trying to be fair or at least to be
perceived as being fair. This prompts researchers to include fairness and the
perception of fairness as factors in conceptions of rational self-interest. See,
e.g., Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating
Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 33–39 (1999); Kent Greenfield &
Peter C. Kostant, An Experimental Test of Fairness Under Agency and ProfitMaximization Constraints (With Notes on Implications for Corporate
Governance), 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983 (2003); Peter H. Huang, Reasons
Within Passions: Emotions and Intentions in Property Rights Bargaining, 79
OR. L. REV. 435, 474–75 (2000); Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal
Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1818–19 (2000); Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly
Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 433, 459.
118
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119
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83 (1993); Geoffrey Brennan, Comment, What Might Rationality Fail to Do, in
THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY 51, 52 (Karen Schweers Cook & Margaret Levi
eds., 1990); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra note 4, at
1062.
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Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1766 (1998); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism,
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REV. 1309, 1320 (1986); Korobkin & Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, supra
note 4, at 1065.

Great Recession and Rhetorical Canons of Law & Economics 43
maximization,121 the consequences for legal discourse points to the
same goal: that law should be communicated to people in a
manner that maximizes the incentives to the reader to accept and
be persuaded by the legal communication, and minimizes the costs
imposed by the communication.
CONCLUSION
The rhetorical canons of law and economics did not cause the
Great Recession. Canons of rhetoric are tools for legal discourse,
not universal goals and not perfect solutions. Law and economics
provides a rhetorical lens through which a legal author might
examine and improve the persuasiveness of her discourse. But a
lens, like any other tool, is only as good as its user. My
examination and critique of the canons seeks to reveal the
interconnected relationships of the canons so as to trace the
canons, and the assumptions and theories that they represent, in
ongoing legal economic discourse.
Modern and contemporary rhetoric has advanced and improved
upon the basic perceptions of human behavior and knowledge of
human nature of the ancient rhetoricians, but the more complex
models of reasoning in contemporary rhetoric have not replaced
the classical rhetorical concept of ethos. Contemporary rhetoric
has learned lessons from cognitive studies and brain science that
confirm the importance of the classical rhetorical concept of pathos
and the necessity that rhetoric examine the values of the audience
in the rhetorical situation so as to anticipate the emotional reaction
of the audience to the discourse. Similar lessons are being learned
in contemporary law and economics as brain science and cognitive
studies add to our “understanding of understanding” and motivate
our study of motivation, adding to the behavioral science that seeks
to improve the designing of incentives in the face of new
conceptions of rational choice. Each discipline can learn lessons
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from the other about the motivation and persuasion of different
audiences in different situations.
Contemporary rhetoric can learn much from the new school of
contemporary rhetoric, law and economics. Efficiency, when used
in appropriate ways in appropriate rhetorical situations, can
improve discourse in style, arrangement, and invention. The
expression of legal conditions and legal effects in the language of
incentives and costs inspires imagination that allows better
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of laws and
legal policy; its widespread acceptance in the law is only further
evidence of the rhetorical power of the language across many areas
of the law and many legal situations. The persuasiveness of
mathematics and science extends to their forms and the substance
of their proofs, and the use of the methods and forms may create
meaning and inspire imagination that improves comprehension and
understanding. The forms of mathematics and science can
promote clarity and open demonstration, permitting examination of
the workings of the discourse and promoting the opportunity for
falsification and rebuttal.
The rhetorical tools of law and economics are powerful, but not
universally persuasive. A topic of invention is a single place to
find a method of argumentation, not the only place. Many
audiences will not respond to mathematical and scientific forms,
especially if they are used to attempt to avoid a primary question of
fairness or justice. The intuitive uses of efficiency in form
(elegance, openness, and clarity) and in the elimination of costs
and waste may be widely persuasive, but other economic rhetorical
turns on efficiency (Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency) are best
left to the discourse of economists. Incentives and costs is a
language, and many rhetorical situations accept this language, but
the general application must fit the topic and the situation; simply
identifying something as an incentive or a cost will not be
persuasive if the audience or the situation demands a different
topos for argument or a more apt trope of style.
The ethos of the speaker remains critical in the rhetoric of law
and economics. Many of the sharpest and deepest criticisms of
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contemporary economics start with the assertion that mathematical
and scientific methods of daunting complexity are used to hide the
workings of the reasoning, not to promote understanding or
persuasion. The method is not rhetoric but a resort to the cudgel,
used to overpower the audience with coercion not persuasion. The
formula might hide the workings of the reasoning rather than
openly demonstrate the reasoning for falsification or rebuttal, all
under an implied challenge and a dare to rebut the force of such a
powerful device. Charts and diagrammatics may be used to
distract the audience or trick them into believing a mathematical or
scientific analysis was performed to produce the assertions made in
the rhetoric, when little or no math or science was involved.
Quantitative analysis may crunch data the true meaning of which is
buried in the assumptions made that chose what data to collect and
what to exclude, and in the premises drawn from the assumptions
that determined the possible conclusions that could be drawn from
the experiment or analysis.
Law and economics relies on mathematics and science,
efficiency, incentives and costs, and rational choice theory for full
and complete communication with legal economists, but often uses
the same topics and tropes as powerful props in communication
with lawmakers and policy-makers—again, rightly or wrongly
according to the ethos of the speaker and the communication.122
The canons of law and economics rhetoric, like the canons of the
other schools of contemporary rhetoric, may be employed to
promote effective communication for the purpose of persuasion, or
be used as mere rhetoric, to distract, confuse, obfuscate, or coerce
the audience. This is a lesson for all rhetoricians, those of law and
economics and of general legal discourse.
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My colleague, David Herzig, summarized this lesson by repeating the apt
comment, “Statistics never lie—but liars use statistics.”

